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significance of ‘family’ 
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Abstract 
 
This article examines the implications for parents and family members when a child is 
diagnosed with a genetic syndrome. In particular, it describes how practices of understanding 
are shaped when the syndrome occurs ‘de novo’, that is, when it has not been inherited from 
either parent and where there is no family history. Despite a significant body of research 
exploring the social implications of genetic disease and diagnostic technologies, sociological 
understandings of the implications of a de novo mutation are considerably limited. This 
article draws on semi-structured interviews conducted with twenty three parents of children 
diagnosed with 22q11 deletion syndrome, a syndrome associated with high rates of de novo 
cases. Three themes were identified: ‘lay’ understandings of genetics; making genetic 
connections and genetic gatekeeping. Overall, this article articulates and confirms the 
enduring significance of family for contextualising health and illness.    
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Introduction 
 
This article explores the implications for parents and families when a child is diagnosed with 
a genetic syndrome caused by a new mutation. Drawing on the accounts of parents of 
children diagnosed with 22q11 deletion syndrome1, three themes were identified: ‘lay’ 
understandings of genetics; making genetic connections and genetic gatekeeping. The context 
for this article is the wealth of research exploring the social and ethical implications of 
developments in genetic knowledge. A significant body of literature within the social 
sciences focuses on individual and collective responses to these developments. At the 
personal level, a genetic diagnosis or identification of genetic risk can alter an individual’s 
sense of identity (McConkie-Rosell, et al., 2008). Many authors recognise that in contrast to 
other types of disease, a genetic syndrome also has specific and significant implications for 
others (Hallowell et al., 2003).  
 
‘Genetic responsibility’ has emerged as a heuristic device to examine how or whether genetic 
knowledge shapes social relationships and the obligations one feels towards oneself and 
others (Hallowell, 1999; Novas & Rose, 2000; Arribas-Ayllon et al., 2008; Weiner, 2010).  
Genetic technology informs a redefined concept of ‘responsible’ parentage involving 
understanding risks and making informed decisions in light of genetic knowledge (Lupton, 
2003).  As Nelkin and Lindee (1995) assert: 
                                                 
1
 22q11 deletion syndrome has an interesting history of nosology which is as much about political preference as 
it is about medical classification (Author XXXX). The parents in this study used a variety of names including 
22q11 deletion syndrome, velocardiofacial syndrome and DiGeorge syndrome. To gain a semblance of 
consistency and avoid confusion, in this article I employ the label 22q11 deletion syndrome throughout.  
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[Genetic] explanations have a double edge, for while they shift responsibility to DNA, 
they create a new biological form of blaming – for the ‘flawed’ parents who pass on 
‘bad genes’, for those who knowingly take genetic risks (1995 p129) 
 
However, those who are implicated by these new technologies are not just parents or 
potential parents. The relationships, including wider kin, which are given prominence through 
these developments are now described as ‘risky’ (Featherstone et al., 2006) and mobilised 
through a “web of genetic connectedness” (Novas & Rose, 2000). The significance of these 
relationships are reflected in the construction of risk and responsibility (Walter et al., 2004; 
Gaff et al., 2007) and in exploring adaptation and familial communication strategies (Forrest 
et al., 2003; Keenan et al., 2005, Gregory et al., 2007). However within these genetic 
networks, the obligations and responsibilities that members perform and display towards each 
other are complex. Although genetic diagnosis might bring new explanations of disease 
causality, the context within a diagnosis, or illness, is given meaning can be characterised 
through continuity. The home, family and social relationships often provide the location 
within which health and experience is experienced. What makes a ‘family’ and how roles and 
relationships are defined and enacted has been extensively documented. Despite many 
changes to the structure of the family, many of the obligations and responsibilities that 
individuals feel towards each other are constant yet continuously being negotiated (Finch & 
Mason, 1993; Finch, 2007).  
 
When a child is ill or receives a diagnosis, the impact on the family, and on particular 
members within the family, can be considerable. It is important to note, but possibly not 
surprising within this context, that genetic technology also has disparate effects. We know 
that women are often the key communicators of medical knowledge within the family and 
this role is enhanced by the possibilities of genetic testing (Richards, 1996; Forrest et al., 
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2003). d'Agincourt-Canning (2001) found for example that women frequently undergo 
genetic testing if that knowledge will benefit others in the family. 
 
However, the family as the context within which diagnosis and illness are located is 
important to note for another reason, beyond the provision of care. Families are recognised as 
key sites where values are shared, and where responses to health and illness are reproduced 
(Gregory, 2005). This confirms multiple routes for translating and assimilating biomedical 
information. Parsons and Atkinson’s (1992) article ‘Lay constructions of genetic risk’ marked 
a decisive moment within medical sociology research. It provided an insight into the 
experience of those with, or at risk of, a genetic disorder. It highlighted that biomedical 
concepts such as ‘risk’ were neither neutral nor universal and thus confirmed that ‘lay’ 
perspectives and experiences were valuable sites of knowledge production and sociological 
enquiry. By documenting how individuals made sense of risk within their everyday 
experience, the importance of context was established, as described by Michie and Marteau 
(1996):  
New knowledge, especially where science or technology is involved, is assimilated 
into individual’s existing frameworks of knowledge and understanding by anchoring 
the unfamiliar to what is already familiar, and rendering abstract concepts into 
something more concrete...knowledge acquisition is therefore a dynamic process that 
takes place within a social, rather than an individual, context.   (1996 p107) 
  
Yet despite this wealth of knowledge about the social implications of genetic knowledge, 
little is known about how, and whether, families respond to or adjust their patterns of 
understanding when the condition is not inherited. One significant exception to this is 
McLaughlin & Clavering (2011). Their anthropological and sociological approach to 
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understanding the impact on the family following the diagnosis of a genetic syndrome 
provides new insight, framing the de novo diagnosis as a mark of ‘difference’ to be 
negotiated. Specifically they suggest that the identification of a de novo mutation can disrupt 
a sense of kinship, where the mutation ‘distorts the biological bond between parents and 
child’ (p406).  
 
Genetic counselling literature also appears to take the stance that a de novo mutation has 
substantially different implications. With regard to communication strategies, Leonard and 
Newton (2010 p202) highlight  
“…there are some genetic conditions that are not going to be of relevance to other 
family members. To this end, it is neither necessary nor desirable that genetics 
services be involved in disseminating all kinds of genetic information to families. For 
example, where a genetic condition has arisen de novo in a particular individual it 
would be inappropriate to undergo family dissemination because that condition would 
not be present in family members.”    
 
Indeed, the calculation and dissemination of ‘risk’ information to others in the family might 
not be appropriate in the case of a syndrome arising de novo. This type of mutation event 
occurs at the time of fertilisation, which means only future progeny of the child would be ‘at 
risk’. However, this article confirms the multiple ways in which a de novo diagnosis is 
relevant to parents and relatives. By focusing on the experiences of parents with a child who 
has been diagnosed with a genetic disease that has arisen through a de novo mutation, or 
rather in this case, a de novo deletion, this article therefore challenges and extends current 
understanding. It highlights the importance of recognising similarities between accounts of a 
genetic disease which is familial and that which is caused by a de novo mutation. In doing so, 
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it confirms that a genetic disease caused by a de novo mutation has considerable implications 
for ‘family’.  
 
What is 22q11 Deletion Syndrome? 
The focus of this study was to explore the meanings of a rare genetic condition, 22q11 
Deletion Syndrome. 22q11 Deletion Syndrome is associated with an expansive and variable 
phenotype of more than 180 potential symptoms, the most commonly reported including 
congenital heart defects, immune deficiency and cleft palate (Murphy & Scambler, 2005; 
Shprintzen & Golding-Kushner, 2008). Incidence is estimated to be 1 in 4,000 live births 
(Scambler, 2000). Diagnosis is either through the clinical presentation of symptoms or 
molecular genetic testing (for example, using FISH -fluorescence in situ hybridization) which 
in most cases would identify a deletion of 30-40 genes on chromosome 22. National and 
international consensus guidelines have been produced as an attempt to create a standardised 
approach to the complex and multidisciplinary management (Basset et al., 2011; Max 
Appeal, 2012). Between 90 to 95% cases of 22q11 deletion syndrome are due to a 
spontaneous de novo deletion (Scambler 2003) which means that there will be no family 
history of the syndrome in the majority of cases. However, due to the variable nature of the 
syndrome and the possibility of very mild symptoms, testing for all parents has been 
recommended, with the provision of support if subsequently diagnosed (Bassett et al., 2011). 
Following their child’s diagnosis, parents will sometimes but not necessarily always be 
offered testing. If neither parent is affected, then siblings will generally not be tested 
(Shpritzen & Golding-Kushner, 2008). 22q11 Deletion Syndrome is autosomal dominant 
which means the offspring of an individual diagnosed with the syndrome will have a 50% 
chance of inheriting the disease.  
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Methodology  
 
This paper reports the analysis of twenty three semi-structured interviews conducted with 
parents of children diagnosed with 22q11 deletion syndrome. The research was part of a 
multi-site ethnography which also involved interviews with clinicians and observations of 
conferences and clinical consultations which are described elsewhere (Author XXXX). 
Ethical approval was gained through the South East Wales Ethics committee and all names 
have been changed to ensure anonymity.  
 
Fifty families in total were contacted, eight of whom were contacted through a clinical 
geneticist. The remaining respondents were contacted through a UK based 22q11 deletion 
syndrome paediatric clinic. Selection was based on a child below the age of 18 who had been 
diagnosed with 22q11 deletion syndrome. Letters were addressed to ‘The Parents and/or 
guardian of [child’s name]’. The response rate was 50% and twenty three interviews were 
conducted by the author. The mother2 of each child was present during all the interviews. 
Seven interviews also involved the father and on two occasions the interview involved the 
mother and grandmother. The age of the child at diagnosis varied considerably, one child was 
diagnosed prenatally and the oldest was diagnosed at 15 years old. All of the interviews were 
conducted within the family home except for two which took place outside of the family 
home at the request of the parents (one in a restaurant and the other in a coffee shop). The 
interviews lasted between one and two hours.   
 
Semi-structured interviews and a loose interview schedule were employed. These techniques 
allowed flexibility and were appropriate as the researcher did not have prior knowledge of 
                                                 
2
 One woman was interviewed as the primary carer of her granddaughter. Where I have included extracts from 
her interview, I have labelled her as “mother”  to preserve anonymity. 
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individual circumstance before meeting the parent or parents. The topics discussed included 
the process of diagnosis, current health and future concerns, and ongoing relationships with 
health professionals. The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim by a 
professional transcription organisation.  
 
The interview transcripts were analysed according to thematic analysis informed by grounded 
theory. Grounded theory, developed by Glaser and Strauss is a systematic approach to data, 
allowing themes to emerge as the research progresses (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996; Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998; Atkinson et al., 2003). Grounded theory provides a research framework that 
can account for the complexity of social phenomena, by constantly and consistently 
developing interpretations of data (Glaser, 1992). The transcripts were read multiple times, 
allowing common themes and ideas to emerge. These were noted, alternative examples found 
in the texts and comparisons drawn from relevant literature. AtlasTi was primarily used as a 
management tool to organise the documents and to systemise the coding structure. In the 
context of the primary aim of the study which was to explore the parental experience of a rare 
genetic disease, twenty primary codes emerged from the analysis, including communication 
within the family, communication with health professionals, diagnosis, genetic risk, the role 
of genetic technology, medical knowledge, sources of support and sources of information.  
The significance of individual and collective responses to a de novo genetic diagnosis 
emerged through this analysis. This discrete topic was selected as the focus of this article 
because of the lack of current research exploring the nature of genetic responsibility in the 
context of a de novo mutation, contrasting with the extensive body of work exploring the 
social implications of genetic inheritence .  
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Analysis 
 
Lay understandings of ‘genetic’ 
 
A de novo deletion was identified as the cause of the syndrome for the majority of families 
who took part in this study. This was not the case for two families. One woman who was 
raising her grandchild suspected that her estranged daughter also had the syndrome. In 
another case, a woman was tested and received her own diagnosis following the diagnosis of 
her daughter. Where a de novo mutation had been identified, diverse metaphors were used by 
respondents to explain the ‘new’ occurrence of a disease within the family. These highlight a 
repertoire of explanations based on a continuum between biology and ‘bad luck’. Parents 
drew on the concept of a system error, for example, a ‘glitch’ [fam02] or an ‘anomaly’ 
[fam07]; a random occurrence, ‘just one of those things’ [fam15] or ‘a one off’ [fam08] and a 
biological event, for example, a ‘flukey thing’ [fam 11], ‘a fluke of nature’ [fam23] or ‘a 
misplaced piece of chemistry’ [fam22]. The descriptions highlight different ways of making 
sense of a spontaneous mutation, and important for this paper, confirm awareness that there 
was a biological catalyst that caused the child’s illness. However, for many it also raised 
concerns. In particular, parents reflected on their understanding of ‘genetic’ and raised 
questions of blame and responsibility. 
  
Making sense of the de novo mutation led parents to question the assumption that ‘genetics’ 
meant ‘familial’. One mother explained, “because it is that word genetic you assume that it is 
from my genes and her dad’s genes we make this child and so one assumes that it has come 
from one of us” [Fam14]. Another mother reported “I wanted to know well if it is genetic 
how come one of us isn’t the carrier?” [Fam23].  The presence of a spontaneous change led 
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parents to raise the possibility that they played a role in its cause. The role of the mother was 
particular prominent in parental accounts. The context for this, the biological bond between 
mother and child, was made overt by one mother, who commented “I understood that it 
hadn’t come from me but obviously I made her...” [Fam09]. 
 
Models of disease inheritance have historically had significant implications for how 
individuals respond to genetic disease (Henderson & Maguire, 2000). Whereas mendelian 
routes of transmission emphasise continuity between generations, here parents are required to 
account for an heritable disease which was not inherited. And here the ambiguity of a de 
novo mutation is revealed. Whereas the de novo mutation can be understood as ‘a misplaced 
piece of chemistry’ or ‘just one of those things’, parents can simultaneously hold themselves 
responsible. Without the possibility of genetic inheritance, a recurring theme in the accounts 
of parents was concern that something had happened during pregnancy that resulted in the 
child having health problems. The agency with which parents allocate to their own role in 
explanations of why a de novo deletion occurred was articulated by one mother “It must have 
been something I did that made this gene do this” [Fam22]. Attention is focused on the 
mother and in particular, what she might or might not have done to trigger the event. The 
following extract represents a typical account of a mother’s search for the cause of her child’s 
illness. 
 
Mother:  When I got the diagnosis as they said you know they said, they tested us all 
and none of us had it and he said it is just one of those things. It is just, not so much 
that you want to place the blame but you want to know if there is a reason behind it. 
So you know it was good in a way to think that I hadn’t done anything, you know you 
don’t mean, I think that every mother would check that out…  it was a real relief to 
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know there was nothing that we could have done or there was nothing that we had 
done to cause it because you know both my pregnancies were both planned, the 
babies, and I took loads of antenatal care and I just couldn’t, I mean I wasn’t dead 
young but then I wasn’t dead old, I just couldn’t work out why and you just think oh 
if I hadn’t had worked, all these things. 
[Fam15 Interview with the mother of Henry, diagnosed at six years old] 
 
Reproduction is a key site where the notion of genetic responsibility play out, including 
making reproductive decisions and how and whether to act on genetic information (Raspberry 
& Skinner, 2011). Although this mother did not have access to genetic knowledge, she 
identified and accounted for particular ‘risk’ factors that might be associated with problems 
during pregnancy. The ‘responsible’ mother, as represented in this account, is one who had 
planned to have children, was an appropriate age for motherhood and took care of herself and 
her baby during pregnancy. In making sense of the child’s illness, pregnancy was constructed 
as a significant period when the baby’s biology was fragile and dependent on the mother’s 
care and attention.  The focus on pregnancy here is therefore not surprising, and the rhetoric 
of motherhood and messages of individual health promotion were vivid within maternal 
accounts of genetic illness.    
 
A tension is therefore revealed in how families might experience a genetic syndrome which 
occurs de novo. A syndrome that is genetic yet not familial can focus attention on the 
activities of the mother during pregnancy. However, the discovery that a syndrome is 
‘genetic’ can absolve parental feelings of guilt, as it confirms that the mother ‘had not done 
anything’ during pregnancy. This is a complex cycle of seeking and ruling out cause in which 
constructions of personal responsibility, and gendered responsibility, play a key role.  
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Making genetic connections 
Some parents in the study were themselves tested following their child’s diagnosis and the 
majority received a negative test. However, the accounts of the parents who received a 
negative test suggest that there remained a tendency to contextualise their child’s diagnosis 
within their own family history of health and illness. The following account highlights that 
although parents recognised the syndrome occurred spontaneously, essential questions 
remained about where the syndrome had come from and who might be implicated.  
 
Mother:  the fact that [son] has got heart problems I thought of my dad because my 
dad had angina…but apparently there is no connection what so ever with that. I don’t 
know much about my own family history because my father is not alive and I don’t 
see my mother and so I don’t know about either side of the family in that respect. So I 
don’t know whether there is any history of it in that but there is nothing in me, 
nothing in [husband]’s family as far as I am aware….it was just a case of it is a fluke 
of nature, literally.     
[Fam23  Interview with the mother of Darren, diagnosed within days of his birth] 
 
In constructing an explanation of the syndrome, parents seek familiarity. In this instance, the 
mother recognised that the syndrome was due to a ‘fluke of nature’ yet continued to 
contextualise this within her family history. Similarities were found between the son’s heart 
condition and the father’s angina. The mother identified the barriers encountered, including 
lack of knowledge about the family and family members. The important point to highlight 
here is that even when parents have tested negative for the genetic mutation, many persist in 
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attempting to identify individuals in the family with known or suspected medical problems. 
These processes reflect established accounts of how individuals and families respond to a 
genetic diagnosis, involving making sense of symptoms (Featherstone et al., 2006) and 
assimilating new information within personal stocks of knowledge (Atkinson et al., 2011). 
The way in which parents attempt to negotiate and attribute responsibility within the family 
even in the case of a diagnosis linked to a new mutation is significant. The utilisation of 
family history to make sense of a genetic syndrome caused by a de novo mutation suggests 
that families draw on a range of resources available to them, including their understandings 
of the meanings of ‘genetic’, biomedical knowledge of genetic transmission and their 
personal and familial experience of health and illness.   
 
Furthermore, the powerful associations of family, in the context of a genetic diagnosis, are 
such that being able to locate the syndrome within the family can be seen as a positive step. 
The following extract highlights how kinship can be used as a resource to provide hope for 
the future.    
 
Mother:  Me and George [husband] have been tested for the deletion and we were all 
right but I still say George has got [the deletion] because to be honest a lot of the 
things that Jimmy [son] does George does. Like it is hard work for George to put pen 
to paper and silly little things like if Jimmy is unwell, he is very red under the eyes 
and George is the same and I do say they have had it wrong with him…. 
Father:  I am a type of guy as well as I like a routine and I like everything in its place, 
that kind of thing, stupid little things but… 
Mother: And silly little things like, where as I would be oh I can do that, George can’t 
do it, and we would always say he has definitely got [it] and I think that he should be 
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tested again because a lot of things like that, what Jimmy [son] can’t do George can’t 
do…... 
Researcher:  So if the test came back that you had it, how would you feel about that? 
Father: Oh it wouldn’t worry me. 
Mother:  We looked at it like that we were hoping that one of us would have had it 
because like I say I am not the brain of Britain and the same as George but either way 
I looked at it and we have survived.   
[Fam25  Interview with the mother and father of Jimmy, diagnosed at five months 
old] 
 
Although many parents questioned whether they or family members had the syndrome, these 
were the only ones to discuss this possibility at length. This occasion could be interpreted as 
the father attempting to repair the ‘distorted bond’ between himself and the child as a result 
of the de novo nature of the deletion (see for example McLaughlin & Clavering, 2011). 
However, I highlight here the collusion of both mother and father in their accounting of 
health and illness. This single extract is important because it reveals how possibilities of 
inheritance can raise powerful emotions about a child and his future. The father’s genetic test 
was doubted because the result contradicted their own observations of shared characteristics 
between father and son. Judgements of sameness are not about symptoms of illness but about 
embodied characteristics, about ‘silly little things’. The father’s characteristics, liking routine, 
redness under the eyes and avoidance of writing are all transformed as potential indicators. 
Featherstone et al., (2006) identified how individuals perform surveillance on themselves and 
others in the family, looking for signs of the development of illness. This single extract 
suggests self-surveillance, but also demonstrates a strong desire to translate the signs into 
symptoms. This extract is particularly revealing because earlier in the interview both mother 
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and father had expressed fears for the child’s future, that he might not be able to maintain 
friendships, hold down a job or live independently. This finding therefore might reflect the 
difficulties of living with uncertainty (Lipinksi et al., 2006). Seeking similarities between son 
and parent becomes a mechanism for predicting the future trajectory of the child’s illness and 
regaining control. Significantly, the desire to repeat the genetic test for this father was not 
fuelled by concern about the father’s health status but it was embraced because it offered 
hope and potential reassurance. This finding has parallels with McAllister et al.’s (2007) 
conclusion that in the context of a child’s genetic syndrome, parents were not necessarily 
concerned about their own health.  
 
This example, of hope being found in the father’s potential diagnosis challenges our 
understanding of illness as biographical disruption and suggests how it can become 
normalised through kinship. In the majority of the interviews parents engaged in 
normalisation practices: the syndrome was not always cast as problematic nor met with fear 
or anxiety, reflecting the development of experiential knowledge and familiarity with illness 
over time (Charmaz, 1991). A family history of disease therefore provides the context 
through which diagnosis and the experience of illness can be located (Featherstone et al., 
2006). The fact that a negative result does not signal the end of the parental quest to 
understand the source of the syndrome is a key finding of the study, and particularly in the 
context of parental testing, contributes to a greater understanding of why negative results can 
fail to reassure (Michie et al., 2003).  
 
 
Genetic gatekeeping 
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The discussion thus far has highlighted the complex network of negotiations and meaning 
making that might surround a genetic diagnosis. Whereas the possibility of genetic 
inheritance might offer hope for some, parental narratives suggest that the marrying of 
‘genetic’ with ‘family’ can also be experienced as a source of conflict that requires 
management. The following extract identifies how within this context, a de novo deletion can 
offer protection from blame.  
 
Mother: But Steve [husband] did find [diagnosis] very difficult to cope with ... and I 
know it sounds daft, but when we had the blood test and neither of us had it so it was 
literally just a mix in the gene pool, because you didn’t feel you were responsible it 
was easier to accept in some ways. 
Grandmother: He was very worried that it might have been in his side of the family 
and it worried him. 
Mother:  I know it sounds funny I was almost wishing it was me because then it took 
the weight off his shoulders, as it was it was nobody.  
[Fam18  Interview with the mother and grandmother of George, diagnosed at eight 
years old]  
 
This mother not only suggests that she would be willing to accept that she might be 
implicated as the source or the reason for her child’s illness but also appears willing to take 
on the burden of cause from her husband. The words of the mother provide further 
information about accounting for responsibility. As explored previously, the responsible 
matriarch is one who prepares for motherhood and makes responsible choices. Here however, 
responsibility is also demonstrated by openness to the possibility of being identified as the 
cause of her child’s problems. In their accounts, mothers in particular, presented themselves 
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as ‘open minded’ to the possibility that they played a role in the transmission of illness to 
their child in terms of both agency (for example, behaviour during pregnancy) and biology. 
Whereas mothers appeared willing to take on this burden of genetic responsibility, in 
contrast, many described how ‘others’ within the family reject this possibility. Parents discuss 
how family members, particularly grandparents, react to the diagnosis of a genetic syndrome, 
highlighting the difficulties of transgenerational communication following diagnosis. “It’s not 
from my side” [Fam10] appears a significant feature in the parental story.  The mother’s 
words below provide an example of how kinship can be reconstructed.   
 
Researcher: Did your family know that you were going to go for testing?   
Mother:  Yes, actually that was quite, that was awful that was because I explained to 
them that if I had it, it would more than likely be run through the family, that made 
them angry. There is nothing wrong with us, you didn’t get it from us blah blah blah 
because [partner] made a comment about it one time and my dad went and bit his 
head off, there is nothing wrong with us, she didn’t get it from our side of the family 
and all I said was that you are not guaranteed that are you.  
[Fam19  Interview with the mother of Rhian, diagnosed at 3 years old] 
 
Whereas research often focuses on the dissemination of ‘risk’ information (Gaff et al., 2007) 
here it is the reaction of family members that draws attention. This mother highlighted how 
her father responded to the news, stating ‘there is nothing wrong with us’ and ‘she didn’t get 
it from our side of the family’. This extract therefore reveals that a diagnosis of a genetic 
disease has the potential for creating division within the family. The use of ‘us’ and ‘our’ are 
significant. ‘Sides’ are identified which map onto individual blood lines, and distinguished 
from the ‘other’. Blame and responsibility are negotiated by making visible one’s own 
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genetic heritage. Within this context, the head of the household appears to take up the role of 
‘bloodkeeper’, protecting personal family heritage from the stigma of tainted blood. Genetic 
tests are therefore simultaneously individualising and collectivising as the information 
revealed is constructed as relating to only one side of the family.   
 
Many of the extracts used in this article highlight how parents can represent themselves as 
responsible by being ‘open’ to the possibility of being the source of their child’s illness. 
However, parent accounts reveal that willingness to accept a role in genetic transmission is 
conditional. Blame is resolutely rejected when it is thrust upon parents from others in the 
family. The threat of blame appears particularly prominent when accounting for the 
behaviour of ‘in-laws’. This was the case for one mother who identified how communication 
within the family about the genetic diagnosis was accompanied by suspicion.     
 
Researcher: Do you remember telling your family that it might be a family genetic 
syndrome? 
Mother: Yes.  And that’s when sort it sort of came out well, “it’s not from my side”. 
Researcher: Who says that? 
Mother: Husband’s side, yeah. 
Researcher:  How did you cope with that? 
Mother: Er, it was quite hard really because, you know, because there was no proof 
either way to be sort of accu- it was almost as if we were accused.  You know, it’s my - 
from my side and it’s my fault.  You know, so that was very hard.  So it was obviously, 
like I said it was a relief when we knew that it wasn’t from either side. 
Researcher:  How did you feel about being tested at the time? 
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Mother:  I think it sort of was a relief really because everybody’s - there was a lot of - 
from my husband’s side of the family, well, it’s not our side, it hasn’t come from our 
side you know, and I was, you know, I was quite open minded.  I didn’t know where it 
had come from and why she had it. 
[Fam10  Interview with the mother of April, diagnosed at one month old] 
 
The rhetoric of blame and responsibility are used carefully in these parental narratives. When 
discussing a child’s genetic illness it is acceptable to be ‘open minded’ for oneself while 
suggesting that other family members are seeking to lay blame. The ‘other’ that is dismissed 
in this way is often distanced from the parent, such as in-laws, or as one mother highlighted, 
an ex-husband “he would have fobbed it off, that if it was genetic it certainly wasn’t from 
him” [Fam30]. Dismissal of the views of others as ignorant has been identified as one way in 
which potential stigma can be managed (Etchegary, 2010). The stories parents told about 
communication patterns suggest how a genetic diagnosis can be negotiated as a stigmatised 
identity. Stigma is a process whereby particular characteristics of a person or group are 
distinguished and ‘discredited’. Examples of stigmatised illness include epilepsy or HIV, 
which might involve practices of concealment and restricted disclosure (Schneider and 
Conrad, 1980; Green, 2003). Whereas stigma is often associated with the reactions of 
‘outsiders’ (Green, 2003), here 22q11 deletion syndrome appears to be stigmatised from 
within the family. Stigma therefore becomes part of, and is managed within, these ‘webs’ of 
kinship.   
 
Managing stigma through protection and rejection is a significant determinant of practice and 
the enactment of family relationships. Genetic gatekeeping is about containment, and one 
example of this is in the re-writing of family history. The reproduction of the family narrative 
20 
 
is a reflexive process. The following account highlights how stories were told about family 
members taking active steps to rewrite their family history to ensure they were not implicated 
in the search for genetic cause.   
 
Researcher:  Were both your families involved in the discussions about the diagnosis? 
Mother: Yes, they were… 
Father:  They were all terrified weren't they that they were somehow going to be 
responsible. They were all trying to distance themselves, in a way, in that they were 
trying to ensure that they… 
Mother:  Interesting over the years as well how much the various members of the 
family, some more than others, but both sides, but some a bit more than others, 
actually altered their medical histories a little. 
Father: Yes.  So the medical history we gave Dr Coombs is not the medical history 
that we now have.  As it happens, there is no - there is nothing.  But they were all so - 
they were all so clearly paranoid that somehow this defect was due to their side of the 
family.  It was quite pathetic really. 
Mother:  And over the years little things have come out about oh, your uncle died of 
this, this and this. 
Father: Congenital heart disease and somebody else had - 
Mother:  Really?  Oh, you didn't tell us that.  Ah, when was that then?  Things like 
that.  All sorts of stuff like that.  Oh, surely we told you?  No.   
[Fam22  Interview with the mother and father of Harry, diagnosed at two and a half 
years old] 
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Within the clinical consultation the documentation of family history is a commonly used 
device for tracing illness through the family and identifying those at genetic risk 
(Featherstone et al., 2006). The family tree is a vital tool that transforms family relationships 
into genetic relationships (Nukaga & Cambrosio, 1997; Author XXXX) and in the context of 
a genetic syndrome, its documentation represents valuable knowledge for current and future 
generations. Yet the extract above demonstrates flexibility in the family narrative. The 
respondents’ attempts to construct a functional account were thwarted by those eager to 
disguise their personal histories in order to protect themselves and their heritage.  
 
In contrast to the potential for fatalism following a genetic diagnosis (Whitmarsh et al., 
2007), the re-writing of family demonstrates engagement. Family history becomes malleable, 
one version of a story which is told or re-told to play a particular role. It is constructed 
through individual or sometimes collectively sanctioned judgements about what symptoms, 
and what histories might be relevant or might incriminate. The rejection of blame and the 
transformation of history from potentially tainted to clean once again emphasises the 
importance of examining personal and collective responses to genetic disease.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Diagnosis, genetic risk and carrier status are highly significant concepts within biomedical 
practice. Advances in genetic technology have redefined disease classifications, resulting in a 
separation of the diagnostic process from the experience of symptoms, thereby blurring the 
boundaries between health and illness (Hedgecoe, 2003; Kerr, 2004; Miller et al., 2005; 
Whitmarsh et al., 2007). This is a salient issue in the context of biomedical advances, with the 
expansion of genetic testing and greater accessibility to one’s own personal genome. The 
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development of new sequencing technologies for example has the potential to radically alter 
the diagnostic landscape for patients and families (Arribas-Ayllon et al., 2011). The resulting 
complexity of genetic knowledge has long been recognised as a critical barrier to 
communication of genetic information. Understanding how parents and family members 
respond to a genetic diagnosis, and how this is transformed by a de novo event, is therefore 
important.  
 
The evolution of 22q11 deletion syndrome offers a timely and compelling opportunity to 
examine the contexts and consequences of genetic diagnosis. 22q11 deletion syndrome has 
attracted extensive scientific interest over the last twenty years, particularly in relation to the 
development of genetic technologies (Shprintzen & Golding-Kushner, 2008, Navon & 
Shwed, 2012). However, this article did not aim to focus on new and exciting promises of 
genetic technology. Instead, it reminded the reader of the importance of understanding the 
grounded experience of living with a genetic syndrome and examining the contextual 
frameworks through which genetic knowledge is translated.  For the parents involved in this 
study, the process of negotiating a de novo genetic diagnosis involved making sense of the 
meanings of ‘genetic’, contextualising new knowledge within established frameworks of 
understandings and managing the response of others. These are the practical realities that 
demonstrate ‘genetic responsibility’.     
 
The concept and meanings of genetic cause, particularly of family associations are powerful 
tools for making sense of illness and negotiating blame (Nelkin & Lindee, 1995; Rosenthal et 
al., 2001; Hallowell et al., 2006; Arribas-Ayllon et al. 2008). This article has demonstrated 
that this remains the case, even when a genetic syndrome is caused by a de novo deletion. A 
diagnosis of a genetic syndrome, irrespective of the pattern of hereditary, has personal and 
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collective implications. This contrasts with current approach that assumes that a de novo 
event is either irrelevant for family members (Leonard and Newton, 2010) or as McLaughlin 
& Clavering (2011) highlighted, is negotiated as ‘difference’ rather than ‘sameness’.  
 
‘Family’ is a significant theme throughout this article. The relationship between a genetic 
diagnosis and family can be experienced as a burden, involving the negotiation of blame, 
rejection and protection. This article suggests flexibility in the role of ‘genetic house-
keeping’. Mothers can accept responsibility and protect family members, yet significantly, 
responsibility can be rejected when blame is thrust from ‘others’ in the family. To know or 
not to know has emerged as a key question within the genetic age (Hallowell, 1999; Weiner, 
2010) and parents are able to protect themselves from accusations because they did not, and 
could not have known about the risk. The de novo deletion is therefore used as a tool to refute 
genetic responsibility. However, a genetic diagnosis can also be valued because of the 
potential to reduce stigma (Phelan, 2002) and answer the question ‘why me?’ (Finkler, 2000). 
This article demonstrates that it is not just diagnosis that is important but also its mode of 
transmission. The genetic nature of the syndrome can be embraced because transmission 
from parent to child son offers hope that the child would enjoy the same quality of life. Here, 
hope is not invested in technological advances but in familiarity.  
 
The responses of some parents in their attempts to understand cause and effect might appear 
proof of the limitations of ‘lay’ knowledge (Prior, 2003). Although patients might 
demonstrate experiential knowledge, Prior warned that “experience on its own is rarely 
sufficient to understand the technical complexities of disease causation, its consequences and 
management” (2003a p53). However, in drawing attention to these occasions, this article 
provides a valuable insight for understanding how genetic ideas are manipulated and 
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extended.  This article confirms the multiple meanings of biomedical information, but most 
importantly, the significance of personal and familiar frameworks of knowledge for its 
translation (Parsons & Atkinson, 1992; Michie & Marteau, 1996).  
 
I acknowledge that this study has several limitations. This study does not necessarily produce 
results that can be generalizable to a wider population. 22q11 deletion syndrome is a rare 
disease and the parents who contributed to this study may not share the same experiences as 
parents of children with different diseases. Likewise, as 22q11 deletion syndrome is 
associated with considerable variation, parents of children with the syndrome may themselves 
not share similar experiences. However, in light of the limited knowledge of how families 
negotiate a de novo genetic event, this article contributes rich detail about how and when 
family connections can become a burden or a resource. By contributing to this study, parents 
displayed a willingness to engage in discussion about their child’s health. Those who are 
unwilling to talk about their experiences represent a hard to reach group and are not 
represented in this study. Therefore I would suggest researchers continue to explore diverse 
perspectives, including the ordinary and extraordinary, to enrich our understanding of the 
multiple implications of genetic knowledge.   
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